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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ARREST - COMMON LAW RIGHT TO RESIST UNLAWFUL ARREST -
JUDICIAL ABROGATION.
State v. Koonce (N.J. Super. 1965)
Defendant forcibly resisted the attempt of a police officer, acting with-
out a warrant, to arrest him for allegedly selling alcoholic beverages to
minors. Although the charges for the illegal sale of alcohol were dropped
for lack of sufficient evidence, defendant was tried and convicted for the
attack upon the arresting officer. On appeal, he asserted his common law
right to resist the arrest since the crime of selling alcoholic beverages to
minors is a misdemeanor and, under New Jersey law, an arrest for a
misdemeanor may be made without a warrant only if the crime is committed
in the presence of the police officer. Because the officer had not observed
the alleged sale, defendant argued that his actions were privileged. The
Superior Court of New Jersey held that the right to forcibly resist an un-
lawful arrest is an anachronism for which there is no longer a convincing
justification. The court reversed defendant's conviction, however, but
declared that its ruling must be applied prospectively. State v. Koonce, 89
N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (1965).
The right of personal liberty is a fundamental one guaranteed to every
citizen, and any unlawful interference with it may be resisted., At common
law every citizen had the right to use reasonable force to resist an unlawful
arrest.2 This doctrine was first enunciated in the early 17th century in
Sir Henry Ferrer's [sic] Case.8 In that case, the defendant, Sir Henry
Ferrers, was charged with aiding and abetting his servant in the murder
of an officer of the Crown. The homicide took place when the officer
attempted to arrest Ferrers on an action of debt with an improperly issued
warrant.4 The court stated that the resistance was justified since the defec-
tive warrant vitiated the legality of the arrest, expressly declaring that "the
killing of an officer in executing [an illegal warrant] cannot be murder...."-5
1. Stanfield v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. 47, 38 S.W.2d 94 (1931). See generally
2 R.C.L. 474 (1914).
2. State v. Robinson, 145 Me. 77, 72 A.2d 260 (1950) ; Wilkinson v. State, 143
Miss. 324, 108 So. 711 (1926). The right to be free from unlawful arrest has been
inherent in Anglo-American jurisprudence since the signing of the Magna Carta (§ 39)
in 1215.
3. Cro. Car. 371, 79 Eng. Rep. 924 (K.B. 1635).
4. The warrant issued for Ferrers' arrest was improperly titled, naming the
arrestee as Sir Henry Ferrers, Knight, when Sir Henry was in fact a baronet.
5. Cro. Car. 371, 79 Eng. Rep. 924 (K.B. 1635). It should be noted that this
court's decision concerning the right to resist an illegal arrest was dicta, since in-
sufficient evidence was adduced to show that Ferrers had aided and abetted his servant.
Some modern American courts have adopted the rule suggested by Ferrer's that
a person who kills an officer attempting an unlawful arrest is not justified, but is
guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. See, e.g., People v. Doody, 343 Ill. 194,
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A similar situation developed thirty-one years later when Hopkin
Huggett asked to see the warrant granting authority for a friend's impress-
ment into the King's military service. When no valid warrant was shown,
a demand for the friend's release culminated in a fracas in which Huggett
killed the impressing officer. At Huggett's trial for murder, the court
polarized the issue before it as being between the fundamental right of
personal liberty and the prevention of potential dangers implicit in allowing
"self help" to safeguard that personal liberty.6 Several members of the
court indicated their belief that:
[I]f a man be unduly arrested or restrained of his liberty ... altho' he
be quiet himself, and do not endeavour any rescue, yet this is a pro-
vocation to all other men of England, not only his friends but strangers
also for common humanity sake ... to endeavour his rescue; and if in
such endeavour of rescue they kill anyone, this is no murder .... 7
The majority held, however, that the dangers to society in permitting "self
help" in the factual situation before it negated the assertion of the inviolable
right of personal liberty.
And we thought it to be of dangerous consequence to give any en-
couragement to private men to take upon themselves to be the assertors
of other men's liberties, and to become patrons to rescue them from
wrong; especially in a nation where good laws are for the punishment
of all such injuries . . . to right men by peaceable means and to dis-
countenance all endeavours to right themselves, much less other men,
by force.8
Although Hopkin Huggetts Case reached a conclusion opposed to that of
Sir Henry Ferrer's [sic] Case, it did not purport to overrule it; in fact, no
mention of the case is found in the record.
An examination of the above cases indicates an early common law
conflict as to whether the fundamental right of personal liberty countenances
the use of "self help" to protect this right. This ambivalence was resolved
in Queen v. Tooley,9 a case now firmly entrenched in English law. In that
case the court clearly stated that ancillary to the right of personal liberty
was the right to resist unlawful arrest. That right extended not only to
the arrestee, but to third parties as well. 10 In reaching this conclusion the
court cited Ferrer's [sic] Case with approval while overruling Hopkin
Huggett's Case.
The rule enunciated in Tooley became strong precedent. Thus, in Rex
v. Thompson" it was held to be "well-established" that a party arrested
without proper authority could use reasonable force to resist the arrest
without criminal liability. Until recently, the law in the United States had
6. 1 Kelyng 59, 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666).
7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 61, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1083.
9. 2d Raym. 1296,92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710).
10. Ibid.
11. 1 Moody 132, 168 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1825). See also Rex v. Patience,
7 Car. & P. 775, 173 Eng. Rep. 338 (N.P. 1837) ; Rex v. Curvan, 1 Moody 132, 168
Eng. Rep. 1213 (K.B. 1826).
SUMMER 1966]
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never varied from the rule in Tooley. 12 Thus, American jurisdictions have
generally held that a peace officer making an unlawful arrest is a trespasser
who has no right to detain the person. The illegal arrest is often declared
to constitute an assault and battery, and the injured party or those coming
to his rescue have the same rights as when repelling any other assault
and battery.'
3
While it is often indiscriminatingly stated that a person may always
resist an unlawful arrest, there are several limitations. One such restriction
limits the quantum of force which may be exerted against the arresting
party. The force used must be no greater than that necessary to meet and
resist the force used to subdue the wronged party.1 4 Thus, even though an
arrest is unlawful, there is a factual question as to whether more force than
necessary was used.15 Another view disallows the arrestee or third parties
to initiate the use of force. 10 The mere statement that a person is under
arrest, even if the officer has no authority, does not justify the use of
repellent force on the officer before an attempt is made to take the wronged
party into custody.'
7
Perhaps the most stringent limitation upon the right to resist unlawful
arrest is that the privilege does not absolve the taking of a life.' 8 However,
if the killing was committed while the resisting party reasonably appre-
hended that he was in imminent danger of death or grave bodily harm at
the hands of the arresting officer, the right of self-defense may be asserted :19
The right to resist unlawful arrest is a phase of the right of self-defense;
that as in other cases of self-defense the person sought to be arrested is
justified in taking life only when he has reasonable ground to appre-
hend that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm;
that he is not justified in killing merely for the purpose of resisting an
unlawful arrest or other restraint upon his liberty where the only
injury which could be apprehended is an unlawful detention for a short
time or other injury short of death or great bodily harm .... 20
There are a few courts, however, which do not apply this limitation. 21 This
minority view would allow a fight to the death of it were necessary to
preserve the arrestee's liberty.2 2 The theory that a person has as much right
to resist invasion of his personal liberty as he has to resist death or serious
12. See, e.g., People v. Dreares, 15 App. Div. 2d 204, 221 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1961) ;
State v. Rousseau, 40 Wash. 2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 (1952) ; Roberson v. State, 43 Fla. 156,
29 So. 535 (1901). See also, HORRIGAN & THOMPSON, SELECTED AMERICAN CASES
ON rHn LAW OF SELF DgFENCP (1874).
13. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 145 Me. 77, 72 A.2d 260 (1950) ; Wilkinson v.
State, 143 Miss. 324, 108 So. 711 (1926).
14. Brown v. United States, 159 U.S. 100 (1895).
15. State v. Miller, 253 Minn. 112,91 N.W.2d 138 (1958).
16. State v. Robinson, 145 Me. 77, 72 A.2d 260 (1950).
17. State v. Francis, 152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 348 (1929).
18. See Roberson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 29 So. 535 (1901). A homicide com-
mitted in the course of resisting an unlawful arrest is, however, generally reduced
from murder to manslaughter. See note 5, supra.
19. Wilkinson v. State, 143 Miss. 324, 108 So. 711 (1926).
20. Id. at 325, 108 So. at 712.
21. Simmerman v. State, 16 Neb. 615, 21 N.W. 387 (1884).
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bodily injury surpasses the right of self-defense. Unlike the prevalent view,
this doctrine treats the rights of resistance to arrest and self-defense as
fundamentally distinct and separate.
23
The historical development of the right to resist unlawful arrest reveals
that this principle is deep-seated in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Yet
the instant case, State v. Koonce,24 specifically rejects that rule25 and ex-
pressly states that it will no longer be applied in New Jersey courts.2 6 New
Jersey is not the first jurisdiction to eliminate this rule; five states have
done so by statute. Four of these states (Rhode Island, New Hampshire,
Delaware and California) 27 have adopted the substance of section five of
the Uniform Arrest Act: "If a person has reasonable ground to believe that
he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is his duty to refrain from using
force or any weapon in resisting arrest regardless of whether or not there
is a legal basis for the arrest. ' 28 Although New Jersey did not adopt section
five of the Act, the court in Koonce expressly based its reasoning on the
underlying rationale giving rise to that section.
This rationale has been discussed by Professor Warner, who is a
darftsman of the Act.29 Professor Warner maintains that the right to
resist unlawful arrest is obsolete in the context of modern society. He
argues that, "the rule developed when long imprisonment often without
opportunity of bail, 'goal fever,' physical torture and other great dangers
were to be apprehended from arrest, whether legal or illegal."'30 In the past,
it was frequently years before a prisoner was brought to trial. Moreover,
when the law of arrest developed, resistance to arrest did not involve the
mutual dangers to arrester and arrestee present today. Peace officers today
are armed with pistols, whereas during the incipiency of the rule officers
were armed only with staves and swords. Consequently, while resistance
at one time could be successfully accomplished merely by holding off the
officer with the arrestee's own weapon until flight could be taken, modern
firearms make serious bodily injury to either or both of the parties a
probable result of resistance. This danger is aggravated by the fact that
the police may use whatever force is reasonably necessary to subdue a
resisting arrestee.
Professor Warner further asserts that it is the armed and belligerent
hoodlum, rather than the innocent outraged citizen, who most often offers
resistance.3 1 An innocent party will generally not risk serious injury to
himself or the arresting officer merely to avoid a brief stay in jail, whereas
23. State v. Bethune, 112 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753 (1919).
24. 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (1965).
25. See note 13, supra.
26. See note 38 and accompanying text, infra.
27. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-10 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 594:5
(1955) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1905 (1953) ; CAL. PENAL CODE § 835(a) (Supp.
1965).
28. UNIFORM ARREST Ace § 5. Illinois has also enacted a law forbidding forcible
resistance to illegal arrest. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 7-7 (1964).
29. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rzv. 315 (1942).
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consciousness of guilt is likely to lead the criminal to resist any arrest
whether he believes it to be unlawful or not, allowing the courts to make
an ex post facto determination of the legality of the arrest.
8 2
Despite the cogency of the arguments advanced in favor of abolishing
the right to resist unlawful arrest, the rule has remained remarkably vital.
The most frequently propounded argument in favor of retention of the rule
is that regardless of the dangers to be perceived, personal freedom is so
fundamental as to demand, not a remedy for unlawful arrest to be provided
by the courts after the fact, but prevention of this unlawful restraint on
personal liberty at its inception. It has been stated that, "In protecting
[the arrestee's] liberty or preventing injury to his person, the law sets such
a high value upon the liberty of the citizen that an attempt to arrest him is
esteemed a provocation ... ."83 It has been further suggested that although
many courts feel the rule should be abolished, they continue to uphold it in
lieu of an adequate substitute.8 4 It is argued that, "civil suits for damages
filed against the individual officer have not proved adequately effective in
preventing police abuse of authority. 8 5 Criminal sanctions also have been
criticized as ineffective. "There are criminal penalties in existence provid-
ing for the punishment of many types of police violations of individual right
but these are ineffective for the obvious reason that policemen and prose-
cutors do not punish themselves."86
Koonce,87 in abolishing the right to forcibly resist unlawful arrest,
has added little to the heretofore existing catalogue of arguments against
the rule. The primary significance of the decision is the long sought judicial
articulation of the above arguments. 8 While the authoritative value of the
decision is diluted by the fact that it was not decided by the highest court
of New Jersey,89 it should nonetheless be followed on the intrinsic merit
32. Ibid.
33. Stanfield v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. 47, 51, 38 S.W.2d 94, 96 (1931).
34. See Comment, 3 TULs. L.J. 40 (1966).
35. Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Moderniza-
tion, 51 J. CRIM. L., C.&P.S. 395, 399 (1960).
36. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN.
L. Rev. 493 (1955). See also, LA FAYE, ARREST - THE DEcIsION Tro TAKE A SUSPECT
INTO CusroDY 426 (1965).
37. 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (1965).
38. The instant case does not mention whether the right to resist an illegal arrest
made by a private citizen is also abrogated. It is submitted that it is not, since the
dangers to be found when a police officer makes the arrest are not present when a
private citizen does so. Furthermore, the court purports to be following, in essence,
UNIFORM ARREST AcT § 5 and the reasons giving rise thereto. This section abrogates
only the right to resist a peace officer and does not affect citizen arrests. The com-
ment to MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, which is identical to section five of the uniform
act, specifically states that the rule is not applicable when the party asserting the
force is unaware that the arrestor is a peace officer, which would indicate that the
rule is not intended to apply to one not a police officer.
39. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has never directly passed on the point at
issue, but the Superior Court said:
Being confident that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would approve the fore-
going views, we declare it to be the law of this State that a private citizen may
not use force to resist arrest by one he knows has good reason to believe is an
authorized police officer engaged in the performance of his duties, whether or not,
the arrest is illegal under the circumstances obtaining.
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of its rationale. Police officers, in recent times, have been subjected to
severe judicial criticism with regard to their occasionally excessive zeal in
bringing wrongdoers to justice. It is heartening to note that the current
highlighting of the rights of an accused has had the incidental effect of
alleviating some of the perils of law enforcement.
In this era of constantly expanding legal protections of the rights of
the accused in criminal proceedings, one deeming himself illegally
arrested can reasonably be asked to submit peaceably to arrest by a
police officer, and to take recourse in his legal remedies for regaining
his liberty and defending an ensuing prosecution against him.
40
It is hoped that other jurisdictions will join New Jersey in abolishing a
rule of law that was salutary at its inception but which has endured beyond
the period when its justification and advisability lapsed.
Lee Sherman
ANTITRUST - SHERMAN ACT - COLLABORATIVE ACTION OF AUTO-
MOBILE MANUFACTURER AND DEALER ASSOCIATIONS TO ELIMINATE
SOURCE OF SUPPLY TO "DISCOUNTERS" IS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 1.
United States v. General Motors Corp. (U.S. 1966)
After an unsuccessful attempt to gain a conviction in a criminal pro-
ceeding,' the Department of Justice initiated a civil action alleging a
conspiracy in restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act
2
against General Motors and three automobile dealer associations.
In 1950, "discount department stores" in the Los Angeles area entered
into arrangements whereby space was leased to independent third parties,
40. Ibid.
1. United States v. General Motors Corp., 216 F. Supp. 362 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
General Motors contended that the entire action was designed as an attack on the
franchise method of merchandising automobiles. Citing Boro Hall Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196, cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943), wherein a substantially identical dealer franchise agree-
ment was held valid, the court sustained the defendant's contention reasoning that
acceptance of the discounters would be tantamount to forcing General Motors to adopt
a method of merchandising not of its own choosing. Concerning the conspiracy, the
court held that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
action of the dealer associations was violative of the Sherman Act. The court con-
cluded that the termination of sales to discount operators did not unreasonably lessen
and restrain competition by applying a balancing of interests test which weighed
consumer interests against the right of free enterprise enjoyed by industry.
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), which provides in
relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .. "
SUMMER 1966]
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for the purpose of merchandising automobiles. The discount outlets, whose
source of supply was franchised Chevrolet dealers, operated under two
principal methods. In the "referral" scheme, a customer would examine
literature and brochures, and in some instances floor models, at the dis-
count operator's location. Upon making his selection, the customer would
then be advised that the automobile would be supplied by a particular
franchised dealer at a discount. No price would be agreed upon at this
time. The dealer would then offer the automobile at a price previously
agreed upon with the discount operator. The other prevalent method
involved consummation of the sale by the discount operator directly with
the customer through the use of a purchase agreement. After the com-
pletion of the agreement, the identity of the franchised dealer would be
revealed. Under both methods, the franchised dealer would furnish the
car and transfer title directly to the customer since the discount operators
did not own any of the automobiles involved. 3
By 1960, 12 of the 85 franchised dealers in the Los Angeles area
were engaged in discount operations. Since title was furnished by a
franchised dealer, the new-car warranty and ancillary free servicing were
preserved. This fact was clearly brought to the attention of the purchasing
public through extensive advertising. At its regular meeting in June 'of
1960, one of the defendant dealer associations, after expressing concern
over the increasing discount operations, resolved to complain to the
Chevrolet's Los Angeles zone office. Pursuant to a meeting with the com-
plaining dealer association, the zone manager approached the franchised
dealers involved, requesting them to desist. When discount sales never-
theless continued, the dealer association instructed its members and their
salesmen to send letters directly to General Motors and to the Chevrolet
Division, soliciting their assistance. The letters spurred an immediate
investigation by General Motors, from which the above facts were ascer-
tained.
The regional Chevrolet manager subsequently met with each re-
calcitrant dealer for the purpose of dissuading them from continuing
discount sales. This effort met with immediate success. 4 After eliciting a
promise to cease discount activities from the dealers involved, General
Motors solicited and obtained the assistance of .the three dealer associations
in the Los Angeles area in order to assure compliance. 5 By employing
investigators who posed as customers, the associations were able to obtain
sufficient evidence of violations to enable the Chevrolet zone manager to
3. Under a typical referral arrangement, the discount operator received $50 per
sale. In instances where the discounter negotiated the sale, one representative agree-
ment called for the franchise dealer to charge $85 over his invoice cost, leaving the
discount operator free to negotiate the best price he could obtain. Some also accepted
trade-ins, and provided financing for the new car purchase.
4. The Court related a conversation between the regional sales manager, and an
offending dealer in which the manager states: ". . . in handling children, I can tell
them to do something. If they don't do it . . . I can knock their teeth down their
throats." United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 136 (1966).
5. All the dealers in the Los Angeles area belonged to one or more of the defen-
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coerce dealers into repurchasing the discount automobiles from the investi-
gators. Through these combined efforts, discount sales in the Los Angeles
area were effectively eliminated.
After an unsuccessful criminal proceeding,6 a civil action was initiated
in the district court seeking to enjoin dealers from conducting discount
operations on the basis that such practices constituted a conspiracy in
restraint of trade.7 Such a practice, contended the Government, amounted
to a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, since it effectively
created a boycott ultimately directed towards price control.
General Motors pleaded that: (1) its franchise agreements with dealers
prohibited the establishment of additional sales outlets without prior ap-
proval; (2) that sales through discount operations amounted to a violation
of this covenant, which was not unreasonable and indeed, was essential to
preserve the entire program of automobile distribution ;8 and (3) by en-
forcing the contractual provision, it was acting unilaterally, without any
agreement or understanding from the dealer associations.
The district court found that the location clause in the franchise
agreement was reasonable, and that the consumer could best be served by
a system of dealer franchising commensurate with the needs of the market.
In addition, the activities of the dealer associations and General Motors
consisted of "parallel action," and the mere fact that all of the defendants
were in pursuit of the same objective did not ipso facto constitute a con-
spiracy to restrain trade, since there was no proof of express collusive
intent. On direct appeal, 10 the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a
conspiracy existed when the recalcitrant dealers were forced to discontinue
operations with the discount operators, through the combined efforts of
the dealer associations and General Motors. Finding a conspiracy, the
court did not pass upon the validity of the location clause. United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
6. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides for the following criminal penalty:
"Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or con-
spiracy declared by sections 1-7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor .. " 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). An un-
successful action under this provision will not bar a subsequent civil suit under section 4
of the Act.
7. United States v. General Motors Corp., 234 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
8. The clause (hereinafter referred to as the location clause) required prior
approval of locations by the manufacturer and stated that the dealer "shall establish
a place of business at a location mutually satisfactory to the dealer and General Motors
and shall not establish a branch sales office without prior written approval of Chevrolet."
Id. at 86.
9. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under The Sherman Act: Con-
scious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. Rev. 655, 705 (1962), for a
comprehensive discussion of "parallel action." Professor Turner, who is presently the
Chief of the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, draws a distinction between
purely parallel behavior by competitors, which is not violative of the Sherman Act, and
actions by competitors based on inter-dependence of decisions, which are sufficient to
amount to an agreement under the Sherman Act.
10. This was accomplished under section 2 of the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823
(1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964), which authorizes a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court in every civil action brought in any district court under the Sher-
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Historically, section 1 of the Sherman Act has involved a continuing
process of attempting to measure questionable commercial practice against
a broadly designed standard. Commenting on the Sherman Act, Chief
Justice Hughes succinctly remarked: "As a charter of freedom, the act
has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable
in constitutional provisions."" To provide some workable guidelines, as to
what constitutes undue restraint, the "rule of reason" was declared in
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States:12 "The criteria to be
resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether viola-
tions of the section have been committed, is the rule of reason guided by
the established law, and by the plain duty to enforce the prohibitions of the
act and thus the public policy which its restrictions were obviously en-
acted to subserve.' u 3 This declaration framed the standard by which the
individual freedom to contract would remain unrestrained, save for pre-
vention of its improper use leading to undue restraint upon freedom of
enterprise. The rule of reason therefore created a protean standard to
meet the universality of the Sherman Act, which would keep apace with
the needs of the nation. With this cursory background, this inquiry may
now be narrowed into examination of the nature of a conspiracy, i.e., the
point where actions by a commercial entity, be it a manufacturer, distributor
or retailer or combination thereof, exceed the ambit of acceptability. Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act prescribes that every contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade is illegal. 14 Fundamental then, to any
section 1 violation is the finding of collusive activity between two or more
parties. This analysis must therefore commence by outlining precisely
what constitutes a conspiracy.
Initially, the preponderance of section 1 litigation was concerned with
ascertaining the degree of permissibility of generally restrictive agreements
between competitors (horizontally) or within the various levels of the
distributive chain (vertically). In 1911, the Court, in Doctor Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,15 stated the general principle
that contractual arrangements between a manufacturer and his distributors
setting stipulated resale prices would not be enforceable. The Court de-
clared that such vertical price agreements were unreasonable per se'6 since
the independent discretion of the distributor would be eliminated. The
Court further reasoned that to hold otherwise would permit the manu-
facturer to achieve a result which would be illegal if the dealers themselves
conspired to fix prices.
1 7
11. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
12. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
13. Id. at 62.
14. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
15. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
16. A per se determination relieves the plaintiff from proving that the alleged
conduct has resulted in a restraint of trade; a burden of proof which might become
formidable in certain situations where the system of merchandising is complex.
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A milestone case in Sherman Act litigation is United States v. Colgate
Co.,"8 wherein the defendant in a criminal proceeding was charged with
stipulating resale prices for its soap products and refusing to transact
business with any dealer who failed to comply. The Court, in affirming an
acquittal, found that the Government has failed to charge Colgate with
establishing any express agreement which would have obligated the dealers
to maintain prices:
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies, contracts
and combinations which probably would unduly interfere with the free
exercise of their rights by those engaged, or who wish to engage in
trade or commerce - in a word, to preserve the right of freedom to
trade. In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the act does not restrict the long-recognized right of a trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exer-
cise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal. And of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances
under which he will refuse to deal.19
Under the Colgate doctrine, a manufacturer is permitted, having
announced a price maintenance policy, to bring about adherance by refusing
to deal with anyone who does not elect to comply. The two essential
elements are: an announced policy of price maintenance, and unilateral
enforcement action through refusal to deal further with violators. Thus,
the standard formulated in Doctor Miles was not diluted, since the Colgate
doctrine still permitted the exercise of independent discretion by the dealer
as to whether adherance to the announced price policy would be in his
best interests. Consequently, the Doctor Miles prohibition against con-
tractual arrangements was not disturbed.
The long process of limiting the application of Colgate commenced
with FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.20 Beech-Nut employed a system of
coding its products as a means of rapidly identifying the purchasing whole-
saler. If a particular retailer was selling at less than the announced
price, Beech-Nut would impose a boycott. In addition, the wholesalers
were required to report all recalcitrant retailers. The Company main-
tained a "black list" file on wholesalers who refused to comply with their
policies on pricing, and prohibited the distribution of products to them.
Only after the wayward wholesaler agreed to adhere to the trade policy
would he be reinstated. In reviewing the judgment of the FTC declaring
this practice to be an unlawful method of competition, the Supreme Court
expressly applied the standard of section 1 of the Sherman Act, as a
"declaration of public policy to be considered in determining what are
unfair methods of competition."21 The contention of Beech-Nut that its
18. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
19. Id. at 307.
20. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
21. The court construed the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964), as authorizing the Commission to forbid practices
which had a "dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly."
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actions were sanctioned by the Colgate doctrine was expressly rejected by
the Court on the basis that the non-existence of any contracts was
irrelevant, since suppressive methods are just as effective as contractual
limitations.
22
Even in the absence of simultaneous action or agreement among
conspirators, conduct resulting from knowledge that concerted action is
contemplated and invited may be sufficient to constitute a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 23 Such was the case in Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 24 where eight motion picture distributors were
induced by Interstate Circuit, the operator of virtually all the first-run
theaters in the principal cities in Texas, to require second-run theaters,
as a condition to doing business, to show certain films as single features
rather than double features at an abnormally high admission price. The
agreements obtained by the unilateral action of Interstate were acquired
individually. However, since each distributor knew that identical agree-
ments were either obtained or being negotiated with competing distribu-
tors, a conspiracy was formed. The result was to force subsequent-run
theater operators to raise prices, thereby reducing the difference between
first-run and second-run showings. This constituted an unreasonable re-
straint, contrary to the interests of the public.
2 5
The conclusion that individual agreements on a vertical plane collec-
tively result in a conspiracy was further strengthened by United States v.
Masonite Corp.26 By means of individual contracts with dealers and
distributors, Masonite reserved the right to establish resale prices for
all of its products. The court found that a conspiracy was created at
the time each dealer realized that others had also agreed, and that the
purpose of the agreement was to effectively reduce competition. All
parties involved, particularly the distributors, were charged with knowl-
edge of the conspiracy since it was the necessary consequence of their
individual actions.2 7  The resulting conspiracy was illegal per se con-
sidering the potential power to inflict public injury through a combination
which had so extensively manifested itself.28
Contracts restricting the process of distribution have also been sub-
jected to close judicial scrutiny. In applying the standard of section 1
of the Sherman Act, the courts have permitted contractual arrangements
restricting the establishment of additional locations through franchising
and similar devices, but only when the principal purpose is to insure
257 U.S. at 453-54. In addition, the Sherman Act was construed as establishing guide-
lines for the determination of unfair competition.
22. See Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
847, 872-85 (1955), for a discussion of the distinction between group boycotts and
refusals to transact business stemming from the existence of contractual obligations
or joint ventures.
23. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453, 455 (1922).
24. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
25. Id. at 226.
26. 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
27. Id. at 275.
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adequate systems of supply and outlets for distribution. However, if
the purpose is to restrict commercial enterprise, such arrangements have
been condemned as unreasonable restraints of trade.29 In United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,30 an antitrust violation was alleged on the
basis of two distinct activities. One activity was an arrangement between
a distributor of tinted lenses and Bausch & Lomb, which granted exclu-
sive manufacturing rights to Bausch in exchange for a covenant not to
manufacture similar lenses for any other market. In the other activity,
the distributor entered into a licensing arrangement with its wholesale
and retail outlets, which was designed to reduce competition and assure
effective price control at every level in the chain of distribution. The
latter arrangement was held to be violative of section 1; however, the
agreement between the manufacturer and the distributor was considered
reasonable, since the overall effect on the consumer was not monopolistic,
and the product involved represented only one-third of the total market.
31
In 1960, the extent of permissible relations between a manufacturer
and his channels of distribution was again brought before the Court in
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. 32 In dismissing a complaint charging
the defendant with a violation of sections 1 and 3,33 the district court held
that a simple refusal to have business relations with retail outlets that
chose to ignore all established and promulgated price policy was not illegal
in light of Colgate.34 On appeal, the decision was reversed on the basis
that more than an announcement of price policy and unilateral action to
enforce it (as sanctioned by the Colgate doctrine) has transpired. Since
Parke, Davis & Co. was able to obtain specific agreements from retailers
(after pursuading some recalcitrant drug stores) to maintain announced
prices or cease carrying its products, a conspiracy to restrain trade was
established. This conclusion was reinforced by the fact that wholesalers
were recruited to assist in policing the one-price policy.
In the instant case, the specific question was whether the actions of
General Motors and the dealer associations constituted a conspiracy in
29. The "test" for ascertaining the validity of such a covenant has been aptly
stated in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898)
[n]o conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying
it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to
protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or
to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party.
The case involved a horizontal restraint of trade among pipe manufacturers in which
the market was divided in a manner that virtually eliminated any element of competi-
tion. In a civil suit, the government was successful in obtaining an injunction under
both common law principles prohibiting restraints on trade and section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.
30. 321 U.S. 707 (1943).
31. Id. at 710.
32. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
33. Section 3 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 3
(1964), declares that conspiracies in restraint of trade involving parties residing in
the District of Columbia are illegal. Since the activities of Parke involved price
arrangements with drug retailers in the District of Columbia, this provision was
applicable. In all other respects, section 3 is identical to section 1.
34. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 164 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1958).
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restraint of trade. The Supreme Court, in rejecting the district court's
finding that no conspiracy existed because there was only "parallel action,"
reiterated the axiom that "explicit agreement is not a necessary part of a
Sherman Act conspiracy." 35 Using the Parke, Davis approach, the Court
found that the entire relationship between General Motors and the
dealer associations, from the inception of the letter-writing campaign to the
rendering of assistance in reporting recalcitrant dealers, was permeated
with joint and collaborative action. The conspiracy was conceived when
the dealers collaborated among themselves and with General Motors to
prevent further sales to discount operators. Thus, not only was the con-
spiracy manifested by the execution and fulfillment of the plan, but at its
inception, when an accord adverse to the interests of the discount operators
was reached between the defendants. The subsequent joint effort of the
dealer associations and General Motors to enforce the promises of the
recalcitrant dealers to desist, was still another incident of collaborative
action. "What resulted was a fabric interwoven by many strands of joint
action to eliminate the discount operators from participating in the market,
to inhibit the free choice of franchised dealers to select their own methods
of trade and to provide multilateral surveillance and enforcement. '3 6 As
to the effect of the collaborative action, a per se violation of the Sherman
Act resulted, since elimination of additional forms of distribution have
long been held as inconsistent with the principles of free enterprise which
the Sherman Act has sought to protect.3 7
Since a conspiracy in restraint of trade was aptly found in accordance
with the body of law which has evolved since Standard Oil, the Court was
not forced to consider the validity of the "location clause" which was
incorporated into the franchise agreement. Litigation in the area of
franchise agreements has been rather sparse in comparison to pricing
arrangement violations. However, the issue has been decided, both in
suits brought by the Government (e.g., Bausch & Lomb,3 8 wherein an
agreement to exclusively deal in certain products was upheld as "not
unreasonable"), and private antitrust suits (e.g., Boro Hall v. General
Motors Corp.,39 wherein a location clause, identical in substance to the
instant case was an effective device to preclude a franchise dealer from
establishing a used-car outlet outside its "zone of influence"). Since this
did not prevent the dealer from selling used cars outside the zone, but
35. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966).
36. Id. at 144.
37. In reiterating the per se rule which prohibits boycotting dealers in the market
place, reliance was placed upon Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Dep't Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207 (1959). That case involved a civil suit in which a chain appliance store was
able to recruit co-operation from major appliance manufacturers to either boycott or
sell at discriminatory prices to the plaintiff. Proof that such a practice had no direct
effect upon the consumer market, since there were "hundreds" of stores which were
not involved, was declared inadmissable and the practice was held a per se violation
because it interfered with the natural flow of commerce.
38. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
39. 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196, cert. denied,
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only prohibited additional locations which would "prejudice" 40 other
dealers, the restriction was not deemed unreasonable, considering the
large degree of competition prevalent in the sales area.
41
In 1963, the Court, in White Motor Co. v. United States,42 dealt
with a civil action involving a vertical franchising arrangement between
a truck manufacturer and his distributors, under which each distributor
was granted the exclusive right to sell in a designated territory. The
district court had found that the contractual provisions creating exclusive
territories were per se violations of the Sherman Act and granted a
summary judgment in favor of the government. 43 Reversing in a 5 to 3
decision, the Court held that a summary judgment is normally inappro-
priate in antitrust suits, since the reasonableness of territorial and customer
restrictions on competition should be determined in a factual finding.44
By reversing, the Court left open the possibility that vertical agreements
are not comprehended by the unreasonable per se prohibition applied to
horizontal agreements. 45 In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, re-
iterating the position of the Court in Interstate Circuit,46 stated: "If it were
clear that the territorial restrictions involved in this case had been induced
solely or even primarily by appellant's dealers and distributors, it would
make no difference to their legality that the restrictions were formally
imposed by the manufacturer rather than through inter-dealer agreement. '47
Thus, emphasis was placed upon an examination of the effect of the
vertical arrangement, rather than the more formalized approach exemplified
by per se condemnation of price restrictions and agreements among
competitors.
The significance of General Motors cannot be considered independent
of FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,4 8 which promulgated guidelines for the deter-
mination of the legality of dealer franchise arrangements. This issue was
not considered in General Motors. In Brown, the defendant appealed from
an FTC ruling that dealer franchising arrangements, as practiced by Brown,
were unfair trade practices in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade
40. Id. at 823.
41. See Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir.
1966), where, in a private antitrust suit, the court also avoided deciding the validity of
established exclusive dealerships by finding a conspiracy to restrain trade, employing
the rationale of the instant case. For other cases where the validity of exclusive
dealerships has not been challenged as such, see Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957);
Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D.C. Md. 1956), aff'd
per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
42. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
43. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
44. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262 (1963).
45. "If competitors agree to divide markets, they run afoul of the antitrust laws."
Id. at 259. See also United States v. Socony-Vaccum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
46. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
47. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 267 (1963).
48. 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
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Commission Act.49 The practice consisted of a system whereby retail
outlets were contractually obligated to deal exclusively with Brown, thus
prohibiting retailers from carrying comparable competitive lines. Of its
650 retail outlets, 250 were so bound. In consideration for services fur-
nished by Brown, such as merchandising record assistance and archi-
tectural services, the retailer agreed "to have no lines conflicting with
Brown. . . ." Finding that the agreement effectively foreclosed Brown's
competitors, the FTC concluded that the contract was an unfair method
of competition within the meaning of section 5, and ordered Brown to
cease and desist.50 On appeal, the Circuit Court reversed, holding that
the power and authority of the FTC did not encompass judgment over the
sales practices involved.' The Supreme Court, however, reinstated the
FTC decree and held 52 that the FTC had extensive powers, 53 especially
in trade practices which conflict with section 1 of the Sherman Act and
section 3 of the Clayton Act,54 to curtail unreasonable trade violations
and practices in their incipiency by projecting the effect upon competition
and the general public.55
By holding in Brown that the FTC has the power to arrest restraints
in their incipiency without proof that actual violations have occurred, in
conjunction with judicial approval of the Commission's analysis of the
particular practice with which Brown was charged, the Court has invested
the Commission with broader powers than can be exercised through the
initiation of a criminal or civil suit. By relieving the Commission from
meeting a burden of proof that a particular practice adversely affects
commerce and trade, restrictive agreements - exemplified by the loca-
49. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1964) : "The Com-
missioner is empowered to prevent persons, partnerships or corporations . . . from
using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce."
50. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 319 (1966).
51. Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45, 56 (8th Cir. 1964).
52. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320 (1966).
53. The interrelationship between the function and jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is con-
cisely discussed in U.S. DEPT. ov JUSIc, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEy GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY TIE ANTITRUST LAWs 374-77 (1955). The relation-
ship between the two agencies has been judicially interpreted to result in an interlacing
of enforcement responsibilities, manifested in part by a "Memorandum of Agreement,"
signed by both agencies in 1948, which established a systematic mutual exchange of
information regarding pending anti-monopoly investigations.
54. See note 2, supra. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to . . . make a ...
contract for sale of goods . . . for . . . resale within the United States . . . on
the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor or competitors of the lessor
or seller, where the effect of such . . . condition, agreement or understanding may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce.
55. For a comprehensive discussion of the Federal Trade Commission, its func-
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tion clause in General Motors - will be placed in greater jeopardy.5 6
Consequently, the effectiveness of the franchise system may be severely
reduced. General Motors, considered narrowly, has prohibited enforcement
of restrictive covenants by any means other than unilateral action.
It is submitted, that restrictive covenants governing the distribution
of commodities will not succumb to a per se death; for the complexities
of efficient merchandising, after sale, servicing and product maintenance,
will require the manufacturer to retain some element of control over the
distributive chain.
57
Edward Charles Toole, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT -
CONVICTION OF CHRONIC ALCOHOLIC FOR PUBLIC INTOXICATION
VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
Driver v. Hinnant (4th Cir. 1966)
Easter v. District of Columbia (D.C. Cir. 1966)
Two recent cases have held that an alcoholic cannot be convicted of
violating a criminal statute prohibiting public intoxication.
In Driver v. Hinnant,' appellant, a chronic alcoholic, was convicted
and sentenced for the crime of public drunkenness. 2 His conviction was
56. In FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953), the
purposes of the Federal Trade Commission Act were delineated:
It is ... clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement
and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act . . . to stop in their incipiency
acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate those acts . . . as
well as to condemn as unfair methods of competition existing violations of them.
57. In his address to the New York State Bar Association Antitrust Law
Symposium held February 2-3, 1966, Mr. Donald F. Turner, the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, discussed the
legality of territorial restrictions. Since the efforts to be expended in any particular
activity are frequently determined by the emphasis placed at the policy-making level,
the following remarks by Mr. Turner are of particular significance:
Without pretending to be exhaustive or definitive, let me deal briefly with the
question "are territorial restrictions more restrictive than necessary to achieve
any legitimate purpose?" . . . I am not convinced that territorial restrictions are
reasonably necessary to any legitimate purpose save for one case, that involving
the entry of new firms and/or the introduction of new products. These are com-
monly associated with relatively high degrees of risk and uncertainty, and it is
not unreasonable to suppose that territorial restrictions may be necessary in many
of such cases to induce dealers to make the investment necessary . . . to get the
product effectively introduced. . . . It should be noted however, that even in this
case, the justification for territorial restrictions is one limited in time. . . . I have
not yet seen a convincing case made for any other exceptions to the rule of
illegality .... Why should some buyers be forced to pay a higher price than they
would otherwise have to pay in order to subsidize purchases by others? . . . To
conclude, my tentative view is that territorial restrictions on dealers are more
restrictive than is necessary to obtain legitimate objectives in all but very limited
circumstances. There are ample alternative devices, all less restrictive than terri-
torial restraints, whereby a manufacturer can attempt to achieve an efficient,
aggressive marketing system.
1. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
2. N.C. GtN. STAT. § 14-335 (1953) provides that "if any person shall be found
drunk or intoxicated on the public highway, or at any public place or meeting, in any
county .... He shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ... "
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affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina,3 and his petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court was denied.4 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 5 holding that because appellant's public
intoxication was involuntary and a compulsion symptomatic of the disease
of alcoholism, he could not be convicted of the crime charged since the
eighth amendment forbids the punishment of a chronic alcoholic for com-
pulsive symptoms of his disease.
Two months later a similar case was presented to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.6 An inveterate
alcoholic had been convicted of public intoxication under a District of
Columbia criminal statute.7 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding, alter-
natively, that the public display of alcoholism by a chronic alcoholic cannot
be a crime because: (1) Congress has recognized that alcoholism is a disease
which deprives its victim of self-control in the use of alcoholic beverages,8
and (2) the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal sanctions
to punish conduct symptomatic of a disease.
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The origin of the ban on cruel
and unusual punishment can be traced to the Magna Carta ° and the English
Declaration of Rights of 1688.11 In Stuart times torture and barbarous
punishments were common, and the provision was designed to correct
such practices. 1 2 In 1776 the phrase formed a part of the Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights,' 3 and James Madison included it in the constitutional amend-
ments he drafted in 1789.14 It was incorporated into the Constitution in
1791 with little debate.15
3. State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
4. Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
5. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
6. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
7. D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-128 (1961) provides: "(a) No person shall in the
District of Columbia drink any alcoholic beverage in any street, alley, park, or park-
ing; No such person shall be drunk or intoxicated in any street, alley, park or
parking; . . ."
8. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-501 (1961). This provision authorizes the courts of the
District of Columbia to take judicial notice of the fact that a chronic alcoholic is a sick
person in need of proper medical care, and that such a person has lost the power of
self-control with respect to the use of alcohol.
9. Most state constitutions have similar provisions. Only Connecticut and Ver-
mont do not have an express prohibition forbidding cruel and unusual punishment.
However, Connecticut does provide against the imposition of excessive fines. CONN.
CONST. art. 1, § 13. Vermont applies the common law existing at the establishment
of the state, including the English Declaration of Rights. See State v. O'Brien, 106
Vt. 97, 170 Atl. 98 (1934). See Note, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 160.
10. See ch. 14 of the Magna Carta, printed as confirmed by King Edward I in
1927, 4 HALSBURY, STATUTES Ov ENGLAND 24 (2d ed. 1948). See also, Note, 41 N.C.L.
Rgv. 244 (1963).
11. See Note, 34 MINN. L. Rgv. 134, 135 (1950). This Note also states that the
provision appeared in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641.
12. FELLMAN, THn DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 207 (1958).
13. VA. CONST., Bill of Rights § 9 (1776) ; Note, 34 MINN. L. Rev. 134, 136
n.26 (1950).
14. Browdy & Saltzman, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An
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Originally, the provision prohibited the wanton infliction of pain by
means of the thumbscrew, the rack, crucifixion, quartering and other tor-
tures.1 0 Cruelty in the method of punishment was condemned, 17 and many
American courts in the 19th century refused to extend this application to
restrict the duration of imprisonment or quantity of punishment.1
8
In 1910, however, the Supreme Court decided in the case of Weems v.
United States'9 that excessive punishment is constitutionally prohibited.
In that case a minor public official in the Philippines had been convicted
of falsifying a public record to conceal the wrongful disposition of a trifling
sum. He was ordered to pay a substantial fine, sentenced to fifteen years
at hard labor in chains, deprived of both his civil and political rights, and
subjected to continual surveillance for life. The Court declared the statutory
penalty to be unconstitutional, 20 resting its decision on the grounds that the
penalty was inherently cruel and that the sentence was excessively severe
in relation to the crime committed. The Court held that the punishment
for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense. In reply to
the assertion that the eighth amendment was only intended to prevent bar-
barous methods of punishment, 21 the Court stated that "there could be exer-
cises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or
mutilation.... [A] principle to be vital must be capable of wider applica-
tion than the mischief which gave it birth.
'22
Although Weems has generally been accepted by both federal and state
courts23 as establishing the rule that excessiveness, as well as mode of
punishment, may be unconstitutionally cruel, it has seldom been used to
hold harsh sentences invalid.24 This reflects the reluctance of appellate
courts to overturn a sentence legislatively authorized and imposed by a trial
16. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1889) ; Warner, Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment, 3 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 117, 119 (1953).
17. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879). The aim of the provision was said
to be the prohibition of unnecessary cruelty and pain.
18. See Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 409-10, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (1893). Many
19th century courts felt that since physical cruelty no longer existed as a punishment
in the United States, the provision was no longer viable. But see Sultan, Recent
Judicial Concepts Of "Cruel and Unusual Punishment," 10 VILL. L. Rev. 271, 272
(1965), where the author describes some of the physically cruel punishments currently
inflicted on prisoners. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3905-08 (1953) permitting
punishment by the lash for five crimes. In State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514 (Del. 1963),
the Delaware Supreme Court held these statutes do not violate the state constitutional
proscription against cruel punishments nor the federal provision against cruel and
unusual punishments.
19. 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
20. The Court was actually construing the Philippine Bill of Rights, but con-
strued and applied a portion of it as identical with the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment. Id. at 383 (dissenting opinion).
21. See Note, 79 HARV. L. Rev. 635, 640 (1966).
22. 217 U.S. at 372-73.
23. Until the case of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme
Court had never definitely stated that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment proscribes cruel and unusual punishment although it -had strongly indicated such
in the earlier case of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
24. FELLMAN, THs DEFENDANT'S RIGHTs 207 (1958).
SUMMER 19661
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1966], Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss4/15
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
court acting within its discretion. 25 Until recently, the constitutional pro-
vision against cruel and unusual punishment had been of ever decreasing
importance.
26
However, in Robinson v. California2 7 decided in 1962, the Supreme
Court applied the eighth amendment in a novel manner. In that case, peti-
tioner was arrested by a police officer who noticed hypodermic needle marks
on his arm and was convicted under a California statute making it illegal
to be addicted to the use of narcotics.28 The Court held that the petitioner,
who was not under the influence of narcotics at the time of his arrest, could
not be criminally punished merely because he had the status or condition
of narcotics addiction. The majority opinion,29 written by Mr. Justice
Stewart, compared the California statute to a law punishing insanity or
leprosy, and declared that such a law "would doubtless be universally
thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.... Even one day in prison would
be cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 30
The Court, emphasizing that addiction is an illness often involuntarily con-
tracted, for the first time shifted the focus of the eighth amendment from
the punishment inflicted to the nature of the conduct prescribed as criminal.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that "cruel and
unusual punishment results not from confinement, but from convicting the
addict of a crime."3' The Court did not object to the segregation of an
addict from society, but required that this confinement be non-punitive in
nature and therapeutically oriented.3 2 The decision is far reaching because
both the Court's definition of addiction as an illness and its declaration that
an illness per se is not punishable are binding on the states through the
fourteenth amendment.
88
25. Note, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 161, 166. But see Coleman v. United States, 357
F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1965), noted 11 VILL. L. RFv. 644 (1966), where an appellate
court reduced the sentence while affirming the conviction.
26. But see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), where the Supreme Court held
that deprivation of citizenship as a punishment for wartime desertion was cruel and
unusual. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, stated that such a
punishment destroys the dignity of man. Also, sterilization has been held to be cruel
and unusual by some lower courts, e.g., Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D. Nev.
1918) ; but held to be constitutional by others, e.g., State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126
Pac. 75 (1912).
27. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (1964).
29. The Court was divided six-to-two. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred on the
ground that the statute as construed punished a bare desire to commit a criminal act.
Justices Clark and White dissented in separate opinions.
30. 370 U.S. at 666-67.
31. Id. at 676.
32. California has recently enacted provisions for the commitment of narcotics
addicts. CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTION CODg §§ 5625-35 (1966). Under these
provisions, if a person, after a hearing and examination, is found to be an addict he
is committed to a hospital for an indeterminate period of not less than three months
nor more than two years. North Carolina has a similar statute providing for the
detention, treatment and cure of inebriates (which includes both alcoholics and addicts).
If a person is judicially declared to be an inebriate he is committed to a state institu-
tion for treatment and discharged when cured. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-30 - 35-35
(1950).
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However, the lack of a clear ratio decidendi in Robinson has resulted
in diversity among lower courts and commentators concerning the nature
and extent of the immunity to punishment granted narctics addicts. It has
been asserted that the Court declared the California statute invalid solely
because it prescribed punitive retribution for an involuntarily contracted
addiction to drugs, and that any addiction started by a conscious experimen-
tation with drugs does not require application of the Robinson rule. 34 Also,
the crime charged in Robinson related solely to the condition of addiction
and the Court, in dicta, appeared to recognize the power of the states to
regulate the sale, purchase or possession of narcotics. 35 Thus, one approach
is that "status" and "act" should be sharply distinguished - an "act" being
punishable even if it is a product of the pathological condition. Another
possibility is that because of the strong relationship between certain acts
and a diseased condition, the eighth amendment prohibits punishment of
the act as well as the condition. One state court has adopted the narrowest
reading of Robinson and held that its statute, "penalizes not the status or
condition of addiction but rather the habitual use of narcotics leading to
such status."
'3 6
Driver and Easter in extending the reasoning of Robinson to the dis-
ease of alcoholism have carefully restricted their holdings to a chronic alco-
holic defined by precise standards.3 7 By specifically excluding the excessive
voluntary drinker, they make clear that Robinson requires that there be a
medically recognized disease so that, in the case of alcoholism, a tendency
or predilection towards overindulgence will not suffice.
If Driver and Easter did no more than apply Robinson to another dis-
ease, they would be highly significant. However, by extending constitutional
protection to drunkenness, an involuntary symptom of the disease, they
broaden the status concept to include objective manifestations of the disease.
This extension would seem to be compelled by considering the untenable
alternative that while a person cannot be punished for having a disease, he
can be convicted if he exhibits its symptoms. Although dicta in Robinson8
might indicate that the Supreme Court felt differently, it is difficult to be-
34. State ex rel. Blouin v. Walker, 244 La. 699, 154 So. 2d 368 (1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 988 (1964).
35. 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962); See also Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41,
45 (1921) :
There can be no question of the authority of the state in the exercise of its
police power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and use of dangerous
and habit-forming drugs. . . .The right to exercise this power is so manifest in
the interest of the public health and welfare, that it is unnecessary to enter upon
a discussion of it beyond saying that it is too firmly established to be successfully
called in question.
36. State ex rel. Blouin v. Walker, 244 La. 699, 706, 154 So. 2d 368, 371 (1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 988 (1964). But see State v. Bridges, 360 S.W.2d 648 (Mo.
1962) (per curiam) and Ex parte Rogers, 366 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963),
striking down similar statutes because they punish a status.
37. The court in Driver relied on the definitions of alcoholism prepared by The
National Council on Alcoholism, The American Medical Association, and the World
Health Organization. The court in Easter relied on a District of Columbia statute
defining a chronic alcoholic. D.C. CoD8 ANN. § 24-502 (1961).
38. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
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lieve that the Court would forbid punishment for having a cold, yet permit
criminal sanctions for sneezing. Punishment for such an act would be
tantamount to convicting a person for having the disease itself, in direct
violation of Robinson.
Neither court found that voluntary exposure to the disease should
preclude the application of Robinson. Judge Fahy, speaking for the majority
in Easter, stated:
It should be clear . . . that chronic alcoholism resulting in public in-
toxication cannot be held to be criminal on the theory that before the
sickness became chronic there was at some earlier period a voluntary
act or series of acts which led to the chronic condition. A sick person
is a sick person though he exposed himself to contagion and a person
who at one time may have been voluntarily intoxicated but has become
a chronic alcoholic and therefore is unable to control his use of alcoholic
beverages is not to be considered voluntarily intoxicated.39
Criticism of the above reasoning has two primary bases. First, it is
contended that laws punishing public intoxication or narcotics addiction
deter the initial use of alcohol or narcotics.4 0 While such an argument has
some merit, it disregards the present diseased condition of the accused and
effectively results in the punishment of a sick man in order to deter others
from exposing themselves to the same illness. The inability to prosecute
a sick man will not dilute the effectiveness of a statute punishing voluntary
public intoxication or the sale, possession or use of narcotics by a person
who voluntarily commits such acts. Such activity should be met with severe
sanctions as long as it is the product of a free will but not when it is the
compulsive act of a diseased man.
The second criticism of Judge Fahy's rationale is illustrated by the
case of State ex rel. Blovin v. Walker.41 In that case the Louisiana Supreme
Court denied habeas corpus relief to prisoners who had been convicted of
the habitual use of narcotics. The court distinguished the Louisiana statute42
from the one declared unconstitutional in Robinson by holding that it
punishes not mere addiction but the habitual use of narcotics leading to
addiction, even though the Louisiana statute expressly penalizes addiction 43
and no specific instances of use were proved. The court's opinion appears
to be an attempt to circumvent Robinson by reasoning that because the
prisoners once used narcotics, they can now be punished for being addicts.
While present addiction most often results from past use, and Robinson
does not preclude punishment for use, the past acts should be proved just
as in any other prosecution based on specific conduct.
Until the Driver and Easter decisions it was not clear whether Robinson
would be read to disallow the imposition of criminal sanctions for incidents
39. 361 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
40. See Note, 79 HARV. L. Rnv. 634, 639 (1966).
41. 244 La. 699, 154 So. 2d 368 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 988 (1964).
42. LA. REv. STAT. § 40:962 (1950).
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closely related to the disease. Although both courts reached the same con-
clusion their reasoning differed. The Driver court declared that although
Driver's actions comprised the physical elements of a crime, he lacked mens
rea since his conduct was neither actuated by an evil intent nor accom-
panied by a consciousness of wrongdoing. Moreover, his presence in public
was not a voluntary act since he did not will it. In Easter the court relied
on a comprehensive statutory program providing for the diagnosis, com-
mitment and treatment of alcoholics. 44 In addition, Congressional recogni-
tion that an alcoholic possesses no powers of self-control with regard to the
use of alcohol 45 precludes the attachment of criminality to the public intoxi-
cation of a chronic alcoholic. Although the court was thus able to rely on
statutory authority for its conclusion and thereby avoid the constitutional
question, four judges40 specifically stated that their decision would be the
same based solely upon the precedental authority of Driver.
While the court in Driver approaches the issue of whether a chronic
alcoholic can be guilty of public intoxication in terms of criminal responsi-
bility for acts committed while involuntarily intoxicated, no sound reason
is given for restricting its exculpatory doctrine to "symptoms." Involun-
tary intoxication has long been recognized as negating mens rea and excus-
ing conduct otherwise criminal,47 and a condition which negates mens rea
should logically immunize an actor from punishment for any objective con-
duct requiring the presence of criminal intent to be unlawful. Thus, if the
drunkenness of a chronic alcoholic is now constitutionally required to be
recognized as involuntary because it is a compulsive symptom of a disease,
it is possible that a chronic alcoholic can avail himself of the common law
defense of involuntary intoxication in any prosecution for a crime com-
mitted while he was intoxicated.
48
Neither court fully discusses the nature of a "compulsive symptom."
Judge Bryan in Driver states that symptoms of alcoholism may often appear
as a "disorder of behavior. '49 In view of clinical data with regard to per-
sonality and behavioral changes caused by the use of alcohol, this conclusion
is not unreasonable. There are some diseases, however, whose symptoms
44. D.C. CODt ANN. § 24-501-615 (1961).
45. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 24-502 (1961):
The term chronic "alcoholic" means any person who chronically and habitually
uses alcoholic beverages to the extent that he has lost the power of self-control
with respect to the use of such beverages, or while under the influence of alcohol
endangers the public morals, health, safety, or welfare.
46. These were Judges Wright and Leventhal and Chief Judge Bazelon who
concurred in the opinion written by Judge Fahy. Judge McGowan concurred in the
result and in that part of the opinion relying on the District of Columbia statute. Judges
Burger and Tamm joined in an opinion written by Judge Danaher which concurred
solely in the result.
47. State v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 16 Pac. 259 (1888).
48. For example, the District of Columbia statute includes within the definition
of a chronic alcoholic one "who while under the influence of alcohol endangers the
public morals, health, safety or welfare." Three judges in Easter concurred specially
in the result in order to indicate their feelings that Congress "had no thought what-
ever of addressing itself to some revised standards for determining criminal responsi-
bility as to crimes other than public drunkenness." 361 F.2d at 61.
49. 356 F.2d 761, 764 (1966).
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include serious behavioral disorders that constitute major crimes. For
example, it is not unlikely that a defendant prosecuted for rape who has
been found to be a sexual psychopath will argue that his sexual aggression
was a "compulsive symptom" of his psychopathy. 50 If the defendant can
successfully argue that psychopathy is a disease within the meaning of
Robinson, and the rape a compulsion symptomatic of the disease as required
by Driver and Easter, criminal punishment for the act would be constitu-
tionally prohibited.
It is possible that the implications of the instant cases foreshadow an
eighth amendment standard of criminal responsibility, although neither
Driver nor Easter compel such a conclusion. A narcotics addict may be
completely aware that the use of narcotics is a crime yet be unable to control
his craving for drugs and be compelled to steal to satisfy this disease. If
prosecuted for the theft he might argue that the crime was the result of an
uncontrollable urge resulting from his disease. Such a defense, if accepted,
might require the formulation of a kind of an irresistible impulse test under
the eighth amendment. A due process test for the criminal responsibility of
an alcoholic or narcotics addict might follow a standard such as provided by
the Illinois Criminal Code:
A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally
responsible for conduct unless such condition either:
(a) Negatives the existence of a mental state which is an element
of the offense; or
(b) Is involuntarily produced and deprives him of substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.51 (Em-
phasis added.)
The courts in both Driver and Easter would permit the confinement
of an alcoholic as long as it is civil in nature and without the stigma
attached to imprisonment. In Driver the court stated, "of course the alco-
holic-diseased may be kept out of public sight,"'5 2 but the court in Easter
made clear that the absence of rehabilitative and caretaking facilities in a
particular jurisdiction in no way revives the power to imprison. 53
It is submitted that the instant cases are correct, both in applying the
rationale of Robinson to alcoholism and in extending it to include symptoms
of the disease. Although both courts make it abundantly clear that a con-
stitutional test of criminal responsibility is not intended by the instant
decisions, such a test now appears to be within the scope of the eighth
50. There are few diseases whose symptoms are more readily classifiable as
"disorder of behavior" than psychopathy. See CLFCKL4Y, MASK OF SANITY (1955).
51. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 6-3 (1964).
52. 356 F.2d 761, 764 (1966).
53. 361 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1966). But cf. People v. Schaletzke, 239 Cal.
App. 2d 971, 49 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1966), holding that it is not cruel and unusual punish-
ment to imprison a convicted sexual psychopath merely because tests show he will not
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amendment. By choosing to broaden the use of the eighth amendment
through its decision in the Robinson case, the Supreme Court has fore-
shadowed future developments which may have a profound effect on state
substantive criminal law.
Joseph F. Ricchiuti
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - OBSCENITY - EVIDENCE OF PUBLISHER'S
INTENT MAY BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THAT A PUBLICATION
Is OBSCENE WHERE THE CONTENTS OF THE PUBLICATION, STANDING
ALONE, MAY NOT SUPPORT THAT CONCLUSION.
Ginzburg v. United States (U.S. 1966)
In June of 1963 in the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, Ralph Ginzburg and three corporations, Documentary Books, Inc.,
Eros Magazines, Inc., and Liaison News Letter, Inc., were convicted on
all counts of a 28 count indictment, charging them with advertising and
mailing obscene publications in violation of a federal statute.1 From this
verdict, defendants filed a motion in arrest of judgment, or, in the alterna-
tive, for a new trial, both of which were denied by the District Court.2
After the judgments were affirmed by the Circuit Court,3 a final appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court. Certiorari was granted,4 and the Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the Roth test must still be
applied in determining that a publication is obscene, but that in a close case,
a publication should be judged in the context in which it is placed by the
publisher, and thus, evidence of pandering is admissible to support a
determination that the publications are obscene, even though the same
materials might escape condemnation in another context. Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
While Chaucer in his Canterbury Tales provides us with ample evidence
that printed obscenity is not a recent development, the first reported Ameri-
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 states that: "Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy
or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance; .. .[i]s declared to be nonmailable
matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by
any letter carrier." It further provides that:
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails, or
delivery of anything declared by this section to be nonmailable, or knowingly
causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, ... shall be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first
such offense, and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both, for each such offense thereafter.
2. United States v. Ginzburg, 224 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
3. United States v. Ginzburg, 338 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1964). Appellants' convictions
were affirmed based on the opinion of the district judge and also upon an independent
determination of obscenity by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 17.
4. Ginzburg v. United States, 380 U.S. 961 (1965).
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can case dealing with the subject concerned the condemnation in Massa-
chusetts, in 1821, of a book entitled Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure.5 In
1868, the prosecution in England, under Lord Campbell's Acts, of an anti-
Catholic pamphlet published solely for political purposes, resulted in the
formation of the first legal test of obscenity. 6 That is, "whether the tendency
of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publica-
tion of this sort may fall."' 7 Most American courts adopted this test but
interpreted the phrase "into whose hands" as requiring the contested ma-
terial to be suitable reading for anyone who might have access to the publi-
cation, including children.8 Although this interpretation matched the temper
of the times, as early as 1913, enlightened voices protested a rule that allowed
adults to read only that which was fit for children and that allowed con-
demnation of a work to be based on isolated passages that might stimulate
the most sensitive reader without regard to the value of the work itself.9
However, the publication of a pamphlet on sex instruction titled The
Sex Side of Life, whose social value could not be seriously doubted, led
to a modification of this strict interpretation of the Hicklin rule. It was
held that the rule did not bar all publications that might stimulate sexual
impulses and that the main effect of the work should be considered. 10 The
Ulysses cases," decided three years later, held that "the proper test of
whether a given book is obscene is its dominant effect." 2 The court then
proceeded in detail to explain what may be used as evidence of "dominant
effect," including the opinion of approved literary critics.' 3
The view that literary or scientific value should be considered in deter-
mining whether a book was to be classified as obscene and therefore banned,
was recognized by the same court that had decided Ulysses in United States
v. Levine,14 where it was stated that "[t] he standard must be the likelihood
5. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335 (1821). The first reported case in
Anglo-American law on obscenity is Sir Charles Sedley's Case, 1 Keble 620 (K.B.
1663). (Sir Charles was prosecuted for standing drunk and nude on a London balcony
while shouting obscenities at the people gathered below.) For a comprehensive treat-
ment of the very early history of obscenity, see Judicial Censorship of Obscene Litera-
ture, 52 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1938).
6. The Queen ex rel. Henry Scott, 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). The pamphlet, THE
CONFESSIONAL UNMASKED, SHOWING THE DEPRAVITY OF THE RoMISH PRIESTHOOD;
THE INIQUITY OF THE CONFESSIONAL AND T11E QUESTIONS PUT To FEMALES IN CON-
FESSION, was published for political purposes rather than to sexually arouse, but it
was declared obscene anyway.
7. Id. at 371.
8. United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14,571 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879)
Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 43 (1896).
9. See Judge Learned Hand's protest against the Hicklin rule in United States
v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), at 120-21 where, after following the
Hicklin rule, he concludes that "[t]o put thought in leash to the average conscience
of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least
capable seems a fatal policy." Id. at 121.
10. United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
11. United States v. One Book Called Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
12. 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934).
13. Id. at 708.
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that the work will so much arouse the salacity of the reader to whom it is
sentas to outweigh any literary, scientific or other merit [that] it may have
in that reader's hands. . ... 15 Ulysses also indicated that the effect of the
work should be judged by its effect on the normal person in the com-
munity, analogous to the reasonable man in tort law, and not the most
immature or saliciously disposed individual in the community. 16 The cen-
sors, however, continued to be a major force in determining what books
would be allowed to circulate freely, and as late as 1946, the Supreme Court
affirmed without opinion the New York decision banning Edmund Wilson's
Memoirs of Hecate County.17 The basis for the condemnation in this case
was a single but detailed description of sexual intercourse contained in one
short story in an anthology of short stories.' 8
However, in 1957, the Supreme Court, after having ignored the ques-
tion of obscenity for so long, handed down its now famous decision in Roth
v. United States.' In that case the Court held that the proper test to deter-
mine whether a publication is obscene was "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. ' 20 However, the
affirmance of Roth's conviction and the holding "that obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,"'2' gave little true
indication of the future trend of decisions in this area. In Roth, the decision
of the lower court was affirmed on the assumption that the materials were
in fact obscene, as had been determined by the jury under proper instruc-
tions.2 2 However, during the term immediately following Roth, the Court
reversed three separate obscenity convictions, per curiam and without
opinion, in each case citing as authority only the Roth decision.23 The
proper meaning of these reversals and subsequent decisions was stated most
emphatically in the recent case of Jacobellis v. Ohio,24 in which the Court,
while reaffirming the Roth holding that obscenity does not merit the protec-
tion of the first amendment, also made it quite clear that the determination
of what is obscene is a constitutional question and therefore always review-
able by the Court.25 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,26 decided in 1962,
15. Id. at 158.
16. 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
17. Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), per curiam. Affirm-
ance was based on a 4-4 decision, Mr. Justice Frankfurter not participating. For a
detailed discussion of the case and the area of obscenity in general before Roth, see
Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the Constitidion, 38 MINN.
L. Rv. 295-301 (1954).
18. Lockhart & McClure, note 17 supra, at 296.
19. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
20. Id. at 489.
21. Id. at 485.
22. Id. at 489-92.
23. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957); One, Inc. v. Olesen,
355 U.S. 371 (1958) ; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958).
24. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
25. Id. at 187-88.
26. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). In addition to the Roth test of dominant appeal, the
Court here added that the material must be "patently offensive." Id. at 486. Thus the
absurd result reached was that because the publications of Manual Enterprises appealed
SUMMER 1966]
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1966], Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss4/15
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
serves to illustrate the difficulty, however, of such a review by a tribunal
so far removed from the actual setting in which the case first arises, and
lends support to the statements of several justices that the Supreme Court
is indeed ill suited to this task.27
Neverthless, the present test of obscenity is that material is obscene
if it is patently offensive, its dominant theme appeals to the prurient interest,
and it is entirely without any redeeming social value.28 In a companion
case to Ginzburg, involving the book Fanny Hill, it stated that these three
elements must coalesce. 29 It has also been made abundantly clear that this
test is to be based on a national standard because of the constitutional issues
involved. 0 However, this mandate has been widely criticized, especially
by proponents of a jury determination of obscenity.31
Thus, the Ginzburg case has apparently introduced a new and subjec-
tive element into the law of obscenity - "the leer of the sensualist."
Although such subjective elements had heretofore been considered to be
immaterial, several cases would appear to lend support to the proposition
that the publisher's intent is an element to be considered.3 2 However, some
severe constitutional problems arise when a publication is banned and the
only justification given is that the publisher's purposes are contrary to
accepted principles. The Court has already circumscribed itself in this area
by limiting the application of censorship laws only to publications which, if
left unfettered, would constitute a "clear and present danger" to our
government."3
There is no conclusive proof that obscenity in printed form is danger-
ous.3 4 One commentator suggests that obscenity is banned, not because of
solely to a sexually deviant group, there could be no appeal to the prurient interest
of the national community and therefore the materials were not legally obscene. This
reasoning has been at least tacitly overruled by Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502
(1966), which was decided the same day as Ginzburg. 'In affirming Mishkin's con-
viction under a New York obscenity statute, the Court stated: "Where the material is
designed for and primarily disseminated to a clearly defined sexual group, rather than
the public at large, the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in
sex of the members of that group." Id. at 508.
27. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959) (opinion
of Mr. Justice Black) ; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 204 (1964) (dissent of Mr.
Justice Harlan).
28. See notes 19, 25, 26, supra.
29. A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney
General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
30. See note 24, supra at 192-95.
31. Ibid. at 199-203 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren). See
O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court: A Note on Law and Obscenity:
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 NOTRRE DAME LAW. 1 (1964) ; Froessel, Law and Obscenity, 27
ALBANY L. REv. 1 (1963) ; Note, 31 FORDHAM L. Rrv. 570 (1963).
32. United States v. One Book Entitled Contraception, 51 F.2d 525, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
1931); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D.&C. 101, 151 (1949), aff'd sub nora.
Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
33. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; Mendelson, Clear and
Present Danger - From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COL. L. Rev. 313 (1952).
34. See Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the Constitu-
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its danger; but because of its total lack of value.3 5 Lack of value alone,
however, does not seem to be a sufficient basis to deny any form of expres-
sion the protection of the first amendment.36 However, if published ma-
terial is "patently offensive" and completely without value, as are "fight-
ing words, '37 a stronger argument can be made for prohibition of such
expression.
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart, in their respective dis-
sents in Ginzburg, are of the opinion that only "hard core pornography"
may be constitutionally banned by the Federal government since only that
kind of material can be classified as both patently offensive and "utterly
without redeeming social value."3 8 The majority answers the objection that
Ginzburg's materials had redeeming social value in Fanny Hill.39 Referring
to admission of the evidence of pandering in Ginzburg, the Court states:
"It is not that in such a setting the social value test is relaxed so as to dis-
pense with the requirement that a book be utterly devoid of social value,
but rather that . . .where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually
provocative aspects of his publications, a court could accept his evaluation
at its face value."
'40
Perhaps, one of the undisclosed factors that prompted the majority
decision in Ginzburg is the Court's concern over the availability of certain
publications to minors. But in a footnote to his opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart
states that if a case involved a sale to a minor the Court would be presented
with a far different situation.4 1 A separate statute prohibiting the sale to
minors of publications which are not "hard core pornography," but which
are certainly unfit reading material for the young and immature, may pro-
vide a solution to this area of concern.4 2 The obscenity statute invalidated
in Butler v. Michigan43 that prohibited the sale to anyone of any material
which would adversely affect youth does not preclude such a possibility.
This is because it is not unreasonable to infer from Butler that a statute
prohibiting such sales to minors could be constitutionally constructed. 44 The
evolution of a separate standard for the sale of reading material to minors
could be a partial answer to the dilemma in which the Court presently finds
itself. The censors would not then be so ready to condemn, and a truly free
press would be one step closer to reality.
35. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, THE SUPREME COURT
REv. 1, 8-15 (1960).
36. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) ; Manual Enterprises, Inc. v.
Day, 370 U.S. 478, 484-91 (1962).
37. Ibid.
38. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493 (1966) (dissent of Mr. Justice
Harlan) ; Id. at 497 (dissent of Mr. Justice Stewart).
39. See note 29 supra.
40. Id. (Emphasis added.)
41. See note 38 supra, 383 U.S. 463 at 499.
42. See Fagan, Obscenity and Minors, The Case for a Separate Standard, 10
CATHOLIc LAW. 270 (1964).
43. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
44. Id. at 383-84.
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It is submitted that the Court's decisions in Ginzburg and the com-
panion cases, Mishkin45 and Fanny Hill,46 all reach socially desirable results,
but that the means which the Court adopted are not as clearly marked as
had been hoped for. Mishkin should be read to overrule Manual Enter-
prises in that the test of prurient appeal is now, and correctly so, the
prurient appeal to the marketing target of the publisher. Fanny Hill serves
to explain more clearly the Ginzburg holding and in this respect should be
well received. In conclusion, it should be noted that Ginzburg itself gives
effect to the reasoning of Mr. Chief Justice Warren as stated in Roth
nine years ago:
The line dividing the salacious or pornographic from literature or
science is not straight and unwavering. Present laws depend largely
upon the effect that the materials may have upon those who receive
them. It is manifest that the same object may have a different impact,
varying according to the part of the community it reached. But there
is more to these cases. It is not the book that is on trial; it is a person.
The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of
a book or picture. The nature of the materials is, of course, relevant
as an attribute of the defendant's conduct, but the materials are thus
placed in context from which they draw color and character. A wholly
different result might be reached in a different setting.47
Richard G. Greiner
45. Note 26, supra.
46. Note 29, supra.
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CASES AND MATERIALS ON OWNERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT OF LAND.
By Jan Krasnowiecki.t The Foundation Press, Inc., Brooklyn, 1965.
Pp. 837.
Property law teachers are the oxen plowing the legal fields. But do
not underestimate them. Harnessed to a 1066 plow and using eighteenth
century techniques, they have been able to keep 1966 tractors out of the
fields. Today, however, many of the oxen are growing restless under
Langdell's yoke, and Professor Krasnowiecki is one of them. They would
throw it off, but differ as to how to do it. They agree that many valuable
classroom hours are lost teaching laws, such the the Rule of Shelley's
Case, which do not lend themselves to dialogue. The assignment of cases
setting forth the Rule is neither particularly beneficial as a learning tech-
nique, nor is it particularly relevant to the needs of the modem real estate
lawyer. Does it make sense to devote classroom hours to the history of
The Rule of Shelley's Case even in capsuled form? Cannot the Rule be
learned as though it were a mathematical equation? Will the equation be
better learned in the classroom -or from assigned reading? Is it necessary
to test knowledge of the equation? Could the test be handled by a number
of problems? Would the problems be discussed in the classroom? With
each answer to these and other questions comes a variety of teaching
techniques, and this book offers material for many different techniques.
The teacher is given enough material to permit up to ten hours (course
credits) of basic and specialized (land-use) instruction in property law
and he must decide how many of the ten hours are justified and how and
where to place his "level of emphasis."
Professor Krasnowiecki begins with an engaging comparison between
the struggle of the freeholder and his lord and the struggle of the American
citizens and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. He cleverly relates the
shifting and the ultimate disappearance of feudal incidents. Although the
comparison is apposite, in terms of success the taxpayer is clearly an also-
ran. For the student interested in the heroics of the freeholder - the
amaranths of which England is most prideful - there are references to
Plucknett, Pollock and Maitland, and others. The freeholder's struggle
is then (the next 68 pages) placed before the courts and the procedure is
meaningfully explained. The chapter is "concerned mainly with the
remedies of one who claims recognition and protection of his ownership
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
(875)
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in land", and is only an introduction to procedure. It asks how a right and
a remedy are related. It is the cornerstone for an emphasis on procedure
which is found throughout the book.
After the notes and cases on procedure, the author offers all of the
material currently presented in first year property and special courses in
land use. Again, herein lies one of the strengths of this book. It benefits
from the author's indefatigable scholarship; he has winnowed from re-
search those materials which permit complete coverage of the subject.
The first fifteen chapters present basic concepts of adverse possession,
fee simple, landlord and tenant, concurrent ownership, gifts and concurrent
ownership of savings accounts, estates in land, interests in land, and
affirmative covenants, in that order. Of interest is the success with which
the author develops the concept of title (the disappearance of feudal inci-
dents and movement from tenure to ownership) without showing the
maturation of possessory interests into title (Pierson v. Post, et al.).
Professor Krasnowieckl states that the impression that one is playing
games in basic property so that one can handle real problems in later
courses is a pedagogical disaster. He eliminates much of the cause for this
impression by explaining the social thought that led to the formation of
basic property laws and the possible arrangements which will cause the
operation of such laws to achieve the result desired by the client. It is
hard to avoid the impression that property laws do not make sense and
are laws of a game when clear expressions of intent in a written instrument
result in disappointment to the client and there is no policy reason for the
disappointment. Perhaps the pedagogical danger lies in the use of class-
room hours to discuss basic property laws, whereas the more imaginative
students require policy inquiry in depth. To eliminate this danger, Pro-
fessors Bergin and Haskell in their Preface to Estates in Land and Future
Interests, The Foundation Press, Inc. 1966) have offered the traditional
material for preliminary study in order that 12 to 20 classroom hours may
be saved for in-depth case and policy analysis in class. Professor Kras-
nowiecki's material offers a similar opportunity.
With good balance the last half of the book presents the material
generally found in specialized (land use) property courses. In order, the
author presents restrictive covenants, zoning and subdivision, easements,
water rights, urban renewal and eminent domain, and agreements of sale.
The appendices are extremely helpful and include a model agreement of
sale, subdivision regulations, seminar type material on zoning, the model
home owners association form, and material on cooperatives and con-
dominiums and fair housing.
Interestingly, in 837 pages the author has omitted several landmark
cases, such as Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty1 and Berman v. Parker.2
Perhaps the student has benefited from the omission. The author's notes
and more recent cases, which include both the content of the landmark
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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cases and recent developments, are more extensive as a result of the
omission. But should not the student always be interested in the entire
opinion of the Euclid case which was the first decision that placed the
determination of the reasonable use of land in the hands of an administrative
body and took the determination out of the supposedly iron grip of the
owner? Further, the author's thesis that the term police power in a broad
sense includes the power of eminent domain must have its foundation in
Berman v. Parker. As the author says, his thesis runs contrary to the
accepted view. So important is this thesis that the student may want
Berman v. Parker set forth in full rather than paraphrased in another
case later in the book. The thesis places urban renewal, the police power
and the power of eminent domain in the same bed to the delight of the
legal activist. The sources for such a lively thesis deserves more space in
the text.
A thread which is perhaps missing in this book is a study of the
planning process. Professor Lon L. Fuller, in teaching jurisprudence has
used such authors as Michael Polany (The Logic of Liberty, 1951), F. A.
Hayek (The Road to Serfdom, 1956) and Barbara Wootan (Freedom
Under Planning, 1945) and has sharpened the problem of who should do
the planning, of what, and for whom. It seems to me that increasing
public regulation of land use requires inquiry into the planning process
upon which such regulation is predicated. Also there is the question of the
effect of planning and regulation upon mankind. I would hope that some
day the law might go further and ask the psychiatrist, the historian and
the anthropologist questions such as, what the affect upon man is if he is
eliminated from the planning process?; what the affect upon man is when
he cannot make his own arrangements for the use of land?; what hostility
follows?; and what needless litigation?
Professor Krasnowiecki's new casebook has made a distinguished
contribution to the teaching and understanding of law. It is a most pro-
digious and comprehensive text. It confirms the author's reputation as a
scholar and craftsman.
John Stuart Carnes*
DRAFTING A UNION CONTRACT. By LeRoy Marceau.f Little, Brown and
Company, Boston and Toronto, 1965. Pp. 296. $12.50.
In this book, the author states, and more than adequately proves,
his case for precision in the use of the English language embodied in
collective bargaining agreements. At the outset, he lists several qualities
of the natural born draftsman, among these being a passion for exactness,
* A.B., 1947, LL.B., 1953, Harvard University; Professor of Law, Villanova
University; member, Pennsylvania Bar.
t Member of the New York Bar and the Ohio Bar.
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ability to systematize, inventiveness and persistence. As a reader continues
through the book, he is constantly aware of the fact that Mr. Marceau
has carefully adhered to each of the attributes he attaches to the natural
born draftsman. The result is a volume which should prove to be a very
valuable tool to the persons charged with the responsibility for preparing
collective bargaining agreements.
Due to the thoroughness with which the book is written it can, of
course, be a number of things to a number of people. To the novice in
labor-management relations the first three chapters dealing generally with
the principles of drafting, preparing to draft and the style of collective
bargaining agreements are especially valuable. Matters such as applicable
Federal and State laws, reference books, the effect of prior agreements,
and even punctuation and capitalization are considered in depth. While
these matters are usually assumed by a person with some experience in
preparing agreements, a brief review of these basics can be of assistance in
avoiding the pitfalls of carelessness into which even the most experienced
can occasionally fall.
While the first five chapters may be viewed to be too basic by the
"old hand", the author has also dissected complex areas of collective
bargaining agreements with such clarity that one can literally see grievances
and arbitration issues being foreclosed. Moreover, a study of these later
chapters indicates that the author's approach in stating and analyzing the
understanding of the parties, in order to properly express such under-
standing in written terms, forces the parties to reach a clearer under-
standing in the first instance, thus avoiding subsequent disagreements.
Nowhere is the need for clarity in understanding and expression
more important than in the areas of seniority, job classification and sched-
uling. The author quite cleverly approaches these subjects with a concept
entitled "Incumbency," and with the use of a few diagrams he forcefully
demonstrates the need to consider a person, group of persons or things
in relation to each other and to the particular subject matter, be it
identification of a seniority unit, job classification or determination of
methods of promotion and demotion.
Since the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the now
famous Steelworkers cases,1 the matters of grievances, arbitrability and
the authority of arbitrators have received careful attention by the parties
to collective bargaining agreements. The precision with which such pro-
visions must now be drawn cannot be overemphasized. Thus, the author's
treatment of these questions is a necessity for all practitioners in the field,
particularly those representing the management side of the negotiating
table. All of the issues that can arise out of the use of the grievance and
arbitration procedures are considered and discussed in detail, making a
considerable contribution to the utility of the entire book.
1. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers
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It is suggested that the book is primarily in 'the nature of a reference
work to: be consulted repeatedly. Actually, because of the depth and
complexity of the subject matter and the detail in which the author
handles topics such as choosing the correct word or how many copies
to make, it is not an easy book to simply read. In this connection, of
considerable value to the user is the Table of Contents, in which each
Chapter is subdivided into sections dealing with all aspects of the major
chapter heading.
The book includes eleven very helpful appendices, not the least of
which is Appendix III which lists the day or date of all holidays through
1974. Also helpful to the contract draftsman is the Sample Table of
Contents in Appendix IX.
Coupled with the very workmanlike job of Mr. Marceau, the book
will be a valuable addition to the library of labor relations practitioners.
James A. Matthews*
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: 1961-1964. By Vincent A.
Kleinfeldt and Alan H. Kaplan.tt Commerce Clearing House, Inc.,
Chicago. 1965. Pp. 913.
The first comprehensive federal legislation imposing standards of
quality on sellers of foods and drugs was passed in 1906.1 This forerunner
of the present Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 2 proved relatively
ineffectual from the standpoint of consumer protection since a manufacturer
could be prosecuted by the Food and Drug Administration only if he
shipped an article in interstate commerce which he knew to contain false
or fraudulent claims.
Strong consumer interest groups were eventually instrumental in the
passage of the entirely new 1938 Act,3 which vested greater control in
the FDA over interstate traffic of drugs and foods, as well as over cosmetics
and advertising. This Act continued virtually unamended until recently,
when the 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments 4 to the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act were passed as an outgrowth of the much-publicized hearings
of the Senate Anti-Trust and Monopoly Subcommittee. 5 There is a great
paucity of writing and analysis of these most important amendments,
* B.A., 1952, Duquesne University; LL.B., 1957, Villanova University; member,
Pennsylvania Bar.
t Member of the District of Columbia Bar and the New York Bar.
t" Member of the District of Columbia Bar and the New York Bar.
I. Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
2. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1938), as amended 76
Stat. 781 (1962), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1962), and further amended 79 Stat. 227
(1965), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1965).
3. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
4. 76 Stat. 781 (1962), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1962).
5. Hearing on S. 1552 before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1960).
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due in large part to their brief history. Consequently, there is an urgent
need of a comprehensive treatise as an aid to lawyers in the food, drug
and cosmetic industry.
The instant work is admittedly not such a treatise. Nor does it
purport to incorporate the opinions or insights of the authors. It is rather
catalog of all cases decided under the act during the years 1961-1963,
the act itself and amendments thereto, and regulations and policy state-
ments issued thereunder.
The book is the fifth in a series dealing with the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act prepared for the Food Law Institute. The four
preceding volumes each covered similar short periods in the act's history
in the same fashion. This is an especially important volume, however,
since it encompasses the passage of the 1962 amendments.
The cases are organized in the book according to the type of govern-
ment action - seizure, criminal prosecution, or injunction. Most involve
seizures by the FDA for misbranding of drugs by false or misleading
labeling under section 502(a) of the act. It becomes apparent that the
FDA is more successful before the courts than any other government
agency. This is probably because the courts respect the scientific judg-
ment of the FDA, or because in this area of public health, the courts are
extremely receptive to arguments that the consumer might somehow be
harmed.
The remainder of the book is devoted mainly to the act itself and the
regulations of the FDA, a branch of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare. Most important, of course, are those sections setting forth
the 1962 amendments.
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as amended in 1962, is preventive
rather than punitive. Self-regulation and voluntary compliance by in-
dustry are emphasized both in theory and practice. It does, however,
impose strict standards of quality control on industry.
The act now requires a showing of efficacy, as well as safety, before
a new drug is given marketing approval by the FDA. This provision was
supported by the drug industry, as were the sections giving the FDA
broad investigative and inspection powers and requiring the registration of
manufacturers. Industry has been at odds with the government only on
those regulations issued under the act which require the generic name
of a drug to accompany each appearance of the brand name,6 and which
call for re-examination and record-keeping for drugs already on the
market and generally recognized as safe and effective.
The effects of the amendments have been rather startling. Fewer
new drugs are being introduced; only seventeen new drug approvals were
granted during 1965. More research is going abroad, since foreign
6. Drugs; Statement of Ingredients, 28 Fed. Reg. 6375 (1963), 21 C.F.R.
1.104(g) (i) (1966); Prescription - drug advertisements, 28 Fed. Reg. 6376 (1963),
as amended at 28 Fed. Reg. 10994 (1963), 29 Fed. Reg. 257 (1964), 29 Fed. Reg. 7284
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governments are quicker to approve new drugs. This is due in large part
to the great amount of time (approximately 18 months), expense and
paperwork required between drug discovery and FDA marketing approval.
This trend should continue unless government de-emphasizes technicality
in new drug applications and looks for relative rather than absolute
safety and efficacy.
. No insight into the aforementioned problems is acquired from a
reading of Messrs. Kleinfeld and Kaplan's book. There can be scant
appreciation of this controversial and complex act from a bare reading
of its passages. Moreover, the vast majority of cases included are decided
under the 1938 Act. A crying need remains for an illuminating treatise on
food, drug and cosmetic law.
The instant work does achieve the authors' avowed purpose. It
serves as a handy and complete compilation of the act, regulations, and
available relevant material - up to 1963. A similar book would be more
valuable several years hence, when important cases under the 1962 amend-
ments have been decided and included.
Thomas F. Schilpp*
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS. By Bernard F. Cataldo,
Cornelius W. Gillam, Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., John M. Stockton, and
Charles M. Weber.t John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York. 1965. Pp. 880.
When a textbook achieves a compilation of materials rendering a full
scope of coverage of fundamental areas otherwise difficult for an under-
graduate student to obtain, it is indeed an occasion for instant delight.
An Introduction to Law and the Legal Process, written primarily for the
nonprofessional student by five distinguished members of the Business
Law Department of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of
the University of Pennsylvania, reveals remarkably well the full develop-
ment of the law through a concern for its current problems and its applica-
tion to the important substantive areas of contracts, torts, and agency.
Never once does the text indicate in its structure the collaboration by a
group of authors. In contrast to the often met awkwardness of texts
which suffer from collaboration, lending little cohesion to the finished draft,
Introduction to Law and the Legal Process left this reviewer with an
appreciation of the wealth and refinement in the presented materials which
likely could best only be served in the manner of this joint effort.
So often a course in law for the undergraduate student is devoid of
an expressive survey of the full meaning of the law and its historic
* B.S., 1961, Holy Cross College; LL.B., 1964, Villanova University; member,
Pennsylvania Bar.
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development. In the first two parts of this text a full third of the book
has brilliantly drawn together the vital areas of the law's development; its
application to legal reasoning; the court's function in the law; current
problems in the administering of justice; the law's jurisdictional conflicts
and pluralism; and the procedure usually encountered in typical litigation.
Useful repetition of several segments of the judicial structure and process
is quite apparent, but to the lay reader, whether undergraduate or not, its
convenience is comforting to the understanding of these amplified facets
of this most important area.
In the coverage of the law of contracts, an interesting method, quite
different from the classical approach of similar undergraduate texts, is
exercised by the initial study of "consideration" followed by an insight
into the element of damages and mutual assent. However, the depth of
each step which is taken by the authors and the generous discussion of
helpful cases and examples should present the reader with little difficulty
in its study. The treatment of current problems in the law of contracts in
certain areas and a complete discussion of the alternatives lends sophistica-
tion to this text rarely met in other nonprofessional school texts on law
and business law. It was also interesting to note that the breadth of mate-
rials on contract law far exceeds that found in the leading competing
texts.
It is evident that Introduction to Law and the Legal Process is a
new venture in the writing of undergraduate law texts and one which shall
make a significant impact in the much needed improvement of legal educa-
tion at the college level. The authors have prepared an excellent treatment
of an often stilted undergraduate subject and have succeeded in this
accomplishment very likely by being ever mindful of one of their most
important observations: "Legal concepts, doctrines, and rules are not
measuring rods or exact formulas. They are, at best, verbal containers for
judicial discretion."
Leonard I. Tripodi*
THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT. By Harvey Kalven, Jr.t
Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1965. Pp. ix, 190. $4.75.
"The greatest fascination of law study is, I think, to watch some
great event from the real world intersect with existing legal doctrine."'
The great event on the domestic scene during the present decade has
been the emergence of the Negro rights protest movement. The instant
book is a compilation of lectures by Professor Kalven which discuss the
* B.S., 1953, St. Joseph's College; LL.B., 1956, University of Pennsylvania;
member, Pennsylvania Bar.
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
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repercussions the civil rights movement has had on the first amendment.
The book is aimed at tracing the connections between civil rights and civil
liberties. Thus, two popular labels of the day are joined in order to show
their impact on the constitutional doctrine of free speech.
Professor Kalven examines in detail three fresh problems which the
Negro issue has produced for free speech theory. The first is the problem
of group defamation as illuminated by Beauharnais v. Illinois2 and New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.a The second problem surrounds attempts made
to legally curb and control the NAACP, the key case being Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm. 4 The final problem concerns the
self-help tactics of the Negro and the extent to which they represent a new
form of speech entitled to certain privileges. The key case here is Garner
v. Louisiana.5
The first chapter on group libel must be read in conjunction with
Professor Kalven's article on the New York Times case in the Supreme
Court Review.6 Professor Kalven saw Beauharnais as creating two levels
of speech, one being constitutionally protected, the other not. Libel, being
in the latter level along with such phrases as yelling "fire" in crowded
movies, is therefore beneath any first amendment concerns. The Beau-
harnais case involved anti-Negro propaganda which the Court found not
to be protected by the first amendment. After a detailed and thorough
analysis of Beauharnais, the book turns to the New York Times case which,
at first reading, appears to be diametrically opposed to Beauharnais.7
The New York Times case seems to say that libel is at the heart of first
amendment concerns. Some authors have reconciled these two opinions
by restricting the New York Times case to public officials. Professor
Kalven, rather than attempting such an effort, sees the Court in protecting
statements against public officials, as possibly starting a dialectic progression
from public official to government policy to public policy to matters within
the public domain. 8 If the Court follows this logic, a theory of free speech
similar to that which Alexander Miklejohn offered fifteen years ago will
evolve.9 In any event, Professor Kalven points to the statement of Justice
Brennan in the New York Times case as a true expression of free speech.
2. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1963).
4. 372 U.S. 594 (1963).
5. 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
6. Kalven, The New York Times Case - A Note on the Central Meaning of
the First Amendment, Supreme Court Rev. 1964, p. 191.
7. See, for example, Professor Franklin who saw the Court in the New York
Times case as limiting Beauharnais to cases where breach of the peace is actually
threatened; Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a
Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REv. 789, 820 (1964).
8. See Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 35 U.S.L. WEEK 2010 (U.S.
July 5, 1966). In this case the Eighth Circuit extended the libel rule of the New York
Times case by holding that a prominent scientist who actively thrust himself into public
discussion of a controversial foreign policy question cannot recover in a libel suit
against a newspaper that, without malice, published an editorial falsely stating that he
had been held in contempt of Congress.
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We have, he tells us, "a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
10
The second chapter of The Negro and the First Amendment is
entitled "Anonymity, Privacy, and Freedom of Association." Those who
read this chapter cannot help but grasp the important contribution the
NAACP has made to free speech. In 1954 the Supreme Court declared
discrimination in public education to be unconstitutional." This decision
was a reflection of the changing philosophy ,of our era expressed in a new
approach to constitutional rights. 12 The long battle leading to this decision
was spearheaded by the NAACP. The advancement of first amendment
theory arises out of what has often been called the "counterattack of the
South". In brief, Professor Kalven explores the series of Supreme Court
cases dealing with Southern attempts to control and eliminate the effective-
ness of the NAACP. The chapter draws together in logical progression
the national efforts to curb the domestic communist conspiracy and the
South's efforts in opposing the NAACP, which from the South's stand-
point is considered a second domestic conspiracy aimed at revolution.
Many of the legal tactics used to fight communism were unsuccessfully
adopted in an attempt to control the NAACP.
There is a limit to the space accorded a reviewer, and the details of
Professor Kalven's review of the Supreme Court cases cannot be given.
Suffice it to say that they are concise, well correlated and the interdiction
of the McCarthy era progeny of cases on this subject is artful. Professor
Kalven does not, however, give us an answer as to what effect these cases
have on the overall theory of free speech. He points out the five different
legal rules for review of investigatory committees,'" but concludes that the
present cases present an unresolved problem for the first amendment.'
4
10. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 64 (1965).
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ;Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
12. The change from the "separate but equal" doctrine was gradual. In 1938 the
Court emphasized the need for real equality and rejected any attempt at mock equality.
It would not suffice for a state to provide a law school at home for whites and mere
fiscal aid to qualified Negroes to help them attend law schools in other states.
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). In Sipuel v. Board of Regents
of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948), the Court maintained that qualified Negroes
must be furnished the equivalent of legal training within the state if they are not
admitted to the state law school. When Negroes are admitted to a regular state
university, they may not be segregated for purposes of scholastic activity. McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950), the requirement of real equality was stressed as far as to suggest that, at
least in professional education, nothing less than identical treatment would satisfy
the Constitution.
13. The five positions for review of investigative committees evolve from the
Gibson opinion. They are: (1) Some reasonable basis for troubling the particular
witness must be established (majority); (2) The Court should not scrutinize very
carefully a "foundation" if any is offered (Justice White) ; (3) Inquiry is limited to
the substantiality of the state's interest and by the relevance to it of the information
sought (Justice Harlan) (4) Bar all consequential abridgements resulting from dis-
closure (Justice Black) and (5) Create certain islands of inviolate privacy in the
society which a committee could not invade by investigative process (Justice Douglas).
See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
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In the final chapter an attempt is made for forecast the possible
influence the "sit in" cases will have on first amendment theory. While
discussing the most recent "sit in" cases, Professor Kalven focuses
on the Court as protecting the self-help measures of the civil rights
movement. To put it technically, he feels the self-help tactics may be
privileged under the first amendment. Professor Kalven readily admits
that the Court has not adopted this approach, and because of the adoption
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,15 they are not likely to pass on this
issue.1 6
This section of the book attempts to pose the issue in the light of
trespass versus free speech. Thus the question then turns on whether the
forum used during the "sit in" is public or private. The argument would
then evolve around Justice Douglas' expansion of the concept of state
action under the fourteenth amendment to include "quasi-public" places.
Justice Douglas, for example, maintains that restaurants are public ac-
comodations, since state licensing and surveillance of such businesses
become a service to the public rather than a mere income-producing
licensing requirement. Thus, Justice Douglas would conclude that no state
can endow a restaurant "with the authority to manage that business on the
basis of apartheid which is foreign to our Constitution."1 7 Under the
doctrine of trespass versus freedom of speech, the adoption of Douglas'
theory is not necessary, although the resulting argument is the same.
Professor Kalven distinguishes between two categories of private property
to which the doctrine of trespass would apply. He states:
There is at one extreme the private home; that is, property in no
sense open to the public and which is properly viewed as an asylum
for privacy. We are not suggesting that the First Amendment em-
powers anyone to invade the home for the purpose of edifying, with
a speech, its owners against their will. There is, however, the other
extreme - where the property, although privately owned, is in an
important sense open to the public; here values of privacy are at a
minimum 18
The practical problem is the same as that faced by Justice Douglas in
Garner and Lombard where he posed the issue as to whether property
was sufficiently in the public domain so that the owner under the four-
teenth amendment had lost his power to discriminate among invitees on
the basis of race. Neither of these two approaches seems destined to
receive the backing of a majority of the Court.
The "sit in" cases seem to point out and bring to the foreground the
distinction between liberty and equality. The civil rights movement is
essentially a call for equality, a call for that form of justice seen in treating
15. 78 Stat. 241 (1965), 42 U.S.C. 2000(a) (1965). In fact many new state laws
have been passed within the past two years. See Robison & Flicker, Summary of 1964
and 1965 State Anti-Discrimination Laws, 3 L. IN TRANSITION Q. 94 (1966).
16. KALVN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 163, 72 (1965).
17. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 283 (1963). (Douglas, J., concurring.)
18. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 146-47 (1965).
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all men alike. The insistence upon civil rights culminates in a rule of
law with its emphasis on all members of the community being treated
identically rather than what the law should be, this restraint on uniformity
of treatment being the only restraint upon the government. The advocates
of liberty, on the other hand, tend to place greater emphasis on re-
straining government power and limiting what the government may do.
Thus the libertarian often prefers to endure inequality rather than permit
restrictions on liberty designed to establish or protect equality.
Obviously, much can be said for each approach, but they do not
always work hand in hand and the "sit in" cases seem to signify a new
balance between liberty and equality. The influence the "sit in" cases
have had on free speech theory seems minimal; however, Professor Kalven's
presentation of this idea will certainly challenge the intellectuals of this
era.
The Negro and the First Amendment gives very few answers, but it
does illustrate the role of the courts in the present day struggle and presents
a clear documentary on the first amendment. The fact that no answers
are given only points out the fact that there are no absolutes for the first
amendment. The balance of liberty and equality must be struck differently
at different times, reflecting differences in prevailing philosophy. In
illustrating this movement in the first amendment, Professor Kalven has
brought to the attention of his readers the ever present progression in
the law.
William B. Freilich*
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